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Abstract. A stop signal passed without authority (aka SPAD) is one of the most serious types of 
incidents in railways since they potentially cause derailments or collisions. SPADs are complex 
incidents that have been usually analysed as human factors incidents. Human errors of train drivers 
such as slips or lapses have been prevalent in SPAD incident investigations. In the big data era, 
alternatives to the traditional methods can be used to support SPAD analysis of whatever kind. 
Railway systems produce a huge amount of data from a variety of data sources that can be used 
to get a better understanding of the factors involved in SPADs. This paper describes a first trial 
within the Big Data Risk Analysis program (BDRA) in order to combine unstructured data from 
SMIS/IFCS text records with structured data from of railway signals in order to support the SPAD 
management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) defines a signal passed at danger (SPAD) “when a train passes 
a stop signal without authority to do so” (Office of Rail and Road, 2017). Historically, SPADs 
have been involved in serious accidents and incidents such as Landbroke Grove disaster in 1999 
that caused 31 deaths and more than 400 injuries (Stanton & Walker, 2011).  
 
The railway industry has usually mitigated SPAD events adopting engineering solutions 
embedded in train-signalling systems or taking countermeasures from the investigation of human 
factors involved in the causes of SPAD (Filtness & Naweed, 2017; Naweed, 2013). However, 
despite the abundant technical and human factors research, the SPAD problem remains enigmatic 
due to its inherent complexity.  
 
In the last decade, the GB railways have made considerable efforts to define a methodology to 
classify SPADs (RSSB, 2008) and improve SPAD management from the human factors 
perspective (RSSB, 2016). These efforts have produced different “data lakes” related to SPAD 
incidents such as semi-structured records from the Safety Management Intelligence System 
(SMIS) or bespoken human factors databases such the Incident Factor Classification System 
(IFCS).  
 
In era of Big Data, even more data can be added to the data lakes. Technical railway systems are 
also producing a huge amounts of data that may be tapped into them (Van Gulijk, Hughes, 
Figueres-Esteban, Dacre, & Harrison, 2015; Van Gulijk, Hughes, Figueres-Esteban, EL Rashidy, 
& Bearfield, 2017). The combination of these data sources with the SPAD data might provide a 
better understanding of underlying factors involved in SPADs, opening new opportunities to 
improve the SPAD management. But the question is how? This paper describes a Big Data 
approach to integrate SPAD data from SMIS and IFCS database with a railway signals database 
in order to support the SPAD management. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1 Data sources  
This trial uses four *.csv files from three data sources: SMIS, IFCS database and a database of 
signals. SMIS is a database for recording safety-related events that occur on the rail network in 
Britain (RSSB, 2017). Railway stakeholders such as Network Rail or train/freight operators enter 
about 75,000 events per year such as derailments and SPADs. In this exercise, we are just using 
records related to SPADs. IFCS is a database that focuses on human performance and underlying 
causes of rail incidents. These underlying caused are classified using 10 Incident Factors that are 
breakdown by different levels of sub-categories (Gibson, Mills, Basacik, & Harrison, 2015). The 
signal database is a sample of descriptions of signals that is part of the Ellipse Asset Management 
tool of Network Rail. Figure 1 shows the properties that were used to integrate the data.  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Description of the data sources used to support SPAD management. 
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2.2 Data model 
The integration of the data has been implemented in a NoSQL graph database. Graph databases 
store data in the form of nodes and relationships. Nodes represent a piece of information and links 
the relationships between those different pieces of information. The signal data has been 
integrated with a signal taxonomy that maps the standard name of signals with its different 
properties such the type of the signal. This taxonomy has been built based on the standard RS/521 
“Signals, hand-signals, indictors and signs handbook”. Figure 2 shows the data model that 
describes the relationships between the different data sources and the link with the signal 
taxonomy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Data model that integrates the different data sources into a graph database.  
 
A SMIS record contains semi-structured data. The signal involved in the SPAD has been extracted 
from the text description of the record. The text is broken down into sentences and words. The 
words that represent a signal are identified and linked to the pertinent instance of a signal. In our 
model, the IFCS database is divided into two different nodes, the instances of IFCS records and 
the nodes that represent the different incident factors. The IFCS record is linked to the related 
SMIS record.  
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3. Results 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the linkage inside the database for a single SPAD event.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Part of the database that integrates three different types of database (NR signals, SMIS 
database and IFCS database) with the signal taxonomy of the standard RS 521.  
 The nodes with the label between angle brackets such as <SIGNAL>, <LIGHT SIGNAL> or 
<SEMAPHORE> represent concepts of signals from the standard RS 521 in the form of a signal 
taxonomy. The red node with the label “SIG:LM3(SM) LITTLE MILL JN” represents an instance 
of a railway signal (a particular railway signal that is placed in the network) that is linked to a 
node that represents a type of signal of the signal taxonomy. The orange node with the label 
“QNE/2014/…” represents a SMIS record about an SPAD incident. It is linked to an instance of 
signal (LM3 signal) since it represents the signal that was passed in danger. The nodes with the 
label “SPAD(E)-4E04…” and “LM3” represent the sentence of the SPAD description that 
includes the name of the signal and the name of signal respectively. The SMIS record and the 
node with the name of the signal are linked to the corresponding signal. Finally, the green nodes 
represent IFCS records. The nodes with the label “14542” represent the IFCS record number. 
There are two nodes because this particular SPAD instance is classified in two different 
categories, one of them SPAD. The other nodes with the labels “Knowledge, skills and 
experience”, “Communications”, “Equipment” and “Practices and processes” represent the 
different events that are involved in the record and its related incident factor.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The digital transformation of railways is providing a massive quantity of data that opens new ways 
to support safety management systems including human factors. However, this amount of data 
cannot be managed using the traditional data analysis based on small samples of data that usually 
comes from interviews, observations or surveys. Big data techniques are necessary to extract some 
insight from huge sets of data. Because there is no direct interaction with data, a data model has 
to be built in order to conduct the data analysis (Grolemund & Wickham, 2014). 
 
We have proposed a data model (Figure 2) in a database to integrate all the available data from 
the SMIS database, a database with all the railway signals from the British network and the IFCS 
database. This model has been developed for SPAD incidents. At this point, only a few properties 
have been used to build the database such as text descriptions of records and names of signals and 
reference numbers. A taxonomy of signals from the standard RS 521 has been implemented to 
map the different ways of naming signals into standard concepts such as <SEMAPHORE> or 
<LIGHT SIGNAL>. 
 
The added value of building this data model is that it is possible to conduct data analysis without 
interacting with the raw data. The graph database integrates around half a million of nodes of data 
from the three databases and provides the semantics of a standard to avoid ambiguity with the 
names of the signals. That means that all the properties of the databases can be shared or queried 
for search of patters that might support the SPAD management. For example, the SMIS and IFCS 
records describe the SPAD incident and the signal that was passed, but there is no additional 
information about that signal. The integration of the SMIS and IFSC databases with a signal 
database allows to add new information to SPAD incidents such as the type of signal according 
to the RS 521 standard and its technical aspects (e.g. mechanical signal or LED technology).  
  
This trial is just a small proof of concept of how human factors experts can take advantage of new 
techniques that come with the digital transformation of the railways. We believe it is possible to 
deal with all the available data, both in volume and variety, for defining the right semantic models 
to analyse SPADS. This transformation opens new possibilities to get a richer insight in human 
factors by means of the link of the multiple huge data that produce the railway systems.   
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